A SOCIOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE ON IMAGINATION

Tania Zittoun, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland
Vlad Glăveanu, Webster University, Switzerland
Hana Hawlina, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland

ABSTRACT:

This chapter outlines a sociocultural approach to imagination, an approach that considers imagination at once as an individual and cultural phenomenon, grounded in our embodied experience of the world, in social interactions, and in the use of symbolic resources. We begin by reviewing the classical philosophical debates about the nature of imagination – whether it is based on images or experience and whether it is primarily personal or cultural – in order to position the sociocultural framework that builds on the seminal work of Lev Vygotsky. Following this, we review old and recent sociocultural research in this area, focusing on four main issues: imagination and perception, the phenomenology of art experience, intentionality and imagination, and the imagination as generative. We conclude the chapter with an integrative model – the imagination loop – and a discussion of how imagination plays a fundamental role not only for individual development but also the development of society through the construction of collective futures.

KEYWORDS:

Keywords: imagination, sociocultural psychology, Lev Vygotsky, the loop model, creativity, collective futures.

Number of words - Total: 8730 (6359 + References: 2169)
Imagination is the basis of all human activity and an important component of all aspects of cultural life. Absolutely everything around us that was created by the hand of man, the entire world of human culture, as distinct from the world of nature, all this is the product of human imagination and of creation based on this imagination. (Vygotsky, 1930/2004, pp. 9–10)

Imagination can be conceived of as a deeply sociocultural phenomenon that includes a large range of psychological processes enabling us to draw on past experience, recombined in unique ways, so as to create new alternatives and possible futures. In contrast to a view of its expression as “private” or intra-psychological, and of its processes as different from (even opposed to) what is “real”, imaginative processes grow out of social interactions, use cultural resources, build on our experiences of the world while constantly transforming and expanding them. Such an understanding is currently being explored by sociocultural research in psychology. In this chapter, we first review classical philosophical debates grounding most of current discussions on imagination, a discussion that allows us to position the original theoretical propositions by Lev Vygotsky. These are still inspirational for current cultural or sociocultural psychology, a tradition of research we introduce, and it is one that takes the mutual constitution of human development and culture as its point of departure. On this basis, we present current studies in the sociocultural psychology of imagination following the four themes identified by Abraham (this volume). We then show how an integrative model of imagination may actually consider these four aspects of imagination as variations of the same fundamental dynamic. We conclude this chapter by suggesting that such an integrative view of imagination may help us reflect on the conditions of emergence of new collective futures.

1. Classical debates and divisions on imagination

Imagination is an old theme in occidental reflection and theorization, as old as philosophy itself. Given the philosophical roots of psychology, classical divisions in philosophy have found direct echoes in the ways in which psychologists have conceived of imagination (for historical accounts, see Cornejo, 2017; Hviid & Villadsen, 2018). Classical debates have addressed the creative, vs. reproductive nature of imagination, the fact that it may be an inferior or incomplete form of reasoning, its representational nature, as well as whether it is an individual vs. a social and cultural process. In what follows, we briefly retrace the two last of these debates, which are especially relevant for our discussion (see also Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016, chap. 2).

Many theoreticians consider imagination as “having a mental image”, that is, consider that it is related to representation, though some postulate non-visual components. The distinction can be found for instance in Descartes, for whom imagination demands to “see in the mind’s eye” (e.g., a triangle), while reason enables us to conceive ideas which are not visible, such as “chiliagon” (a polygon with 1000 sides, perceptually indistinguishable from a circle); here, reason is considered to be superior (Descartes, 1641, pp. 85–87). In psychology, imagination as a phenomenon based on images – which usually implies that it is reproductive in nature – was taken on by Wundt and Bartlett. In contrast, and during the same period as Descartes, Giambattista Vico (Vico, 1993b, 1993a,
2004) conceived of imagination as an embodied experience, which enables people – individuals and collectives – to confer meaning, and therefore stability, to events that otherwise escape to their understanding. Hence, Vico saw myths as reflecting people’s attempt to make sense of scary events, such as thunders, with their noise, lightning and actual dangers, and imagining that these were due to the anger of gods. As such, these imaginative acts enabled them to render their environment meaningful. Imagination thus appeared as more than merely representational; it is a creative act, filling the gap left by our incomplete knowledge and rationality.

A second important division concerns the individual versus collective or cultural nature of imagination. Descartes, and many after him, saw imagination as something experienced or engaged at the level of the single individual, in his or her mind. Similar views can be found in a large part of the psychological literature (e.g., Byrne, 2005; Harris, 2000; Piaget, 1992). In contrast, Vico’s propositions were that imagination is linked to the social and cultural creation of meaning and the production of cultural artefacts, and that these cultural artefacts guide and enrich further individual imaginings: again, scared of thunders, humans invented myths about the wrath of gods, which were then transmitted orally, as well as through the arts; these artefacts subsequently became resources for other people to imagine gods in sky causing thunders. In this sense, imagination is at the origin of culture, and is nourished by it; it is a sociocultural process. Similarly, Sigmund Freud (1959, 1963, 2001) showed how people use material from books they read or artworks they know in their dreams, and Frederic Bartlett demonstrated that they also do so when asked to see shapes in the clouds (Bartlett, 1916, 1928). Hence, culture appeared early as a theme in the reflection on imagination – as one of its core constituents, rather than merely as a variable.

In this chapter, we will propose a view of imagination as developing across the life course, as creative, multimodal (that is, not only related to images), and above all, as a sociocultural phenomenon. In order to do so, we will first present the assumptions we work with as sociocultural psychologists, which set the stage for such an approach to imagination.

2. What is sociocultural psychology?

Sociocultural psychology, or cultural or cultural-historical psychology, is a domain in psychology that aims at capturing the “cultural” nature of human experience. It is a field that emerged at the conjunction of various disciplines of the humanities and social sciences (see Valsiner, 2012; Valsiner & Van der Veer, 2000). One may say that it developed out of three movements: first, occidental psychologists explored the lands visited by anthropologists and they realized, seeing the “culture” of the others, that they had one too (Cole, 1996; Rogoff, 2003); they had to rethink the very notion of culture. The second stems from sociology, which examines the underpinnings of social groups, movements, narratives, and values; such a “societal” nature of human experience is closely related to the “cultural” one (e.g., Hedegaard, Fleer, Bang, & Hviid, 2008; Valsiner, 1998). A third movement, starting within psychologists studying the process of “socialization” in the form of close interactions in the family, at school, and so on, noticed that what mattered for development was not only what was done and said, but also how things were done and said. Shirley Brice Heath (1983) has thus shown how children from different US communities learned contrasting “ways with words” to tell a story or share experience with others. Infinite variations could be observed and cause
misunderstanding, among others, when the child moved from family to school – here again, invisible differences appeared to be linked to “culture” (Nelson, 2007; Valsiner, 1997). One way or another, these movements invited authors to admit that, if culture is to humans what the water is for the eyes of fish (Bruner, 1990), as psychologists we had to understand this water and the eye as well as their mutual relations. These streams of thought found their grounds and roots in American pragmatism (Valsiner & Van der Veer, 2000), dialogism (Marková, 2016), German Ganzheit psychology (Diriwächter & Valsiner, 2008), and Russian historico-cultural psychology (Ratner, 2012; Zavereshneva & van der Veer, 2018). In all these streams of research, culture was soon considered a central condition of human development (Cole, 1996; Rosa & Valsiner, 2018; Wertsch, 1998) and, with it, perception, reasoning, interactions, emotions and imagination, among others, gained a sociocultural origin and dynamic.

Currently, sociocultural psychologists work with a number of assumptions. Key among them are: a) the mutual constitution between mind and culture, psychological functions and their socio-material contexts; b) the importance of studying the ‘person in context’; c) the fundamental role played by actions and interactions – with others, things, institutions and different facets of culture – for the constitution of the mind; d) the importance of the temporal dimension at different scales, including the evolution of the species and the history of society, development across the life course, and even moment-to-moment interactions; and e) the fact that our psychological life and action in and on the world are mediated by the use of cultural resources, such as signs and tools, and this mediation creates a space for living outside the immediacy of the here and now. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of assumptions and propositions but one that already highlights the profound implications sociocultural psychology has for our understanding of imagination. Within this view, imagination is a process as well as an experience, it is highly contextual, develops over time, mediates action and is, at once, mediated by culture and its various social, material and symbolic resources. This view diverges from contemporary cognitive or neuroscientific accounts and finds its origin in different psychological and philosophical orientations.

3. A foundational cultural understanding of imagination: Lev S. Vygotsky

One of the main inspirations for current explorations of imagination in sociocultural psychology can be found in the influential work of Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky, living and writing in the former USSR between 1896 and 1934. Deeply interested in the historic and cultural shaping of human mind and consciousness, as well as in the role of art in experience and development, he outlined important insights about imagination that can be summarised as follows.

First, Vygotsky was very aware of the classical division in the theorization of imagination at the turn of the 19th century. For him, imagination can indeed be the process by which we complete our perception of the reality (as in Abraham, this volume, and Pelaprat & Cole, 2011). But the specificity of imagination is that it is a creative, higher mental function, processual, not limited to images, and a deeply cultural form of thinking; yet, is can also be more or less rational and emotional, depending on the distance taken from the object at stake.

The argument supporting this claim is that imagination develops along the persons’ progressive mastery of a linguistic system, as well as of various culturally mediated conceptual systems. This
reorganizes people’s thought, and gives them the means to regulate and organize it. “Higher psychological functions”, like imagination, are thus functions which are culturally constructed, and help us taking distance from the immediate stimulations and constraints of the environment. On this basis, Vygotsky saw imagination as intentional or “oriented” (Vygotsky, 2011, p. 173). It develops along childhood and yet, it is during adolescence that the person can start to distinguish and separate more objective or subjective modes of imagining, and more or less concrete or abstract modes (Vygotsky, 1994). Hence, with development, imagination becomes more differentiated and can be combined in various ways: daydreaming, inventing, planning, all of them variations of imagining, leaving more or less space to emotions (Vygotsky, 2011, p. 176).

Through these variations, a core characteristic remains: “the essential feature of imagination is that consciousness departs from reality. Imagination is a comparatively autonomous activity of consciousness in which there is a departure from any immediate cognition of reality” (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 349). We take this intuition as central: in effect, if imagination is characterized by a departure from the immediate situation, it is what gives us a degree of freedom from the constraints of an immediate situation.

Nevertheless, for Vygotsky, imagination is also deeply connected to the social reality in four ways (Vygotsky, 2004). First, it is nourished by one’s experience of the social and cultural world; the richer the experience, the more complex and nuanced the imagination:

“the creative activity of the imagination depends directly on the richness and variety of a person’s previous experience because this experience provides the material from which the products of fantasy are constructed. The richer a person’s experience, the richer is the material his imagination has access to. This is why a child has a less rich imagination than an adult, because his experience has not been as rich” (Vygotsky, 2004, pp. 14-15).

Hence, a child can imagine a house on the basis of houses she has seen, stories she heard, and her unique new synthesis of these; an architect, who has access to more encounters with houses and masters various conceptual systems, can, through his unique creative synthesis, imagine much more complex houses.

Second, imagination is a way to know the world: through books, pictures, narrations, we can build our knowledge of places to which we have never been, or of events we have not directly experienced. In this sense, it allows an expansion of experience via the experiences of others. Third, it is linked to our real, world-related emotional life; if we are touched by a novel, we engage emotions in resonance with experiences we actually had, as if it was a real-life occurrence. And fourth, imagination enables actual creation in the world: “finally, once they were given material form, they returned to reality, but returned as a new active force with the potential to alter that reality” (Vygotsky, 2004, p. 21). It is the combination of these four elements that bring Vygotsky to this strong statement:

“It is precisely human creative activity that makes the human being a creature oriented toward the future, creating the future and thus altering his own present. This creative activity, based on the ability of our brain to combine elements, is called imagination or fantasy in psychology. (...) But in actuality, imagination, as the basis of all creative activity, is
an important component of absolutely all aspects of cultural life, enabling artistic, scientific, and technical creation alike” (Vygotsky, 2004, pp. 9–10).

As part of his cultural-historical psychology, Vygotsky thus sketched an understanding of imagination as essentially cultural. We will now see how these intuitions have been pursued in contemporary research.

4. Four fields of studies for imagination as sociocultural dynamic categories

In this section, we present current studies of imagination in sociocultural psychology, all working with assumptions inspired by Vygotsky. The section is organised in four parts, following the structure proposed by Abraham (fig. 3) in her introductory chapter; the studies we mention use a variety of methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative (for recent methodological overviews, see Tanggaard & Brinkman, 2018; Zittoun, 2016a).

a. Imagination and perception

The relation between imagination and perception has been of key significance for philosophers and scientists working in both areas (Nanay, 2016; Pendlebury, 1996). While this concern has deep historical roots, going back to the old debates regarding the formation, role and status of mental images, it received considerable attention since Kant’s view that “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself” (Critique of Pure Reason A1 20, (Kant, 1999, p. 269)). In an often-cited footnote, Kant argues that this contribution often escaped psychologists because they assumed that perception is limited to reproduction alone and failed to recognize that the “material” it supplies is combined or synthesized (functions that he associated with the imagination). In contrast, more recent accounts of ‘active perception’ (see Thomas, 1999), give perception a major role in imagination itself. As such, instead of having imagination contributing to perception, we also have proponents of imagination emerging from perception. This itself is an old conception that goes back to Hume and his idea that imagined material is basically a paler version of perception (see Nanay, 2016). Adding to the similarity between the two, contemporary neurological research points to commonalities in brain activity when perceiving, remembering and imagining, and their association to areas such as the anterior hippocampus (Zeidman & Maguire, 2016). While reviewing the philosophical debates concerning the direction of the relationship between perception and imagination are beyond the scope of this chapter, two main observations can be derived from these discussions. One of them is that perception and imagination ‘collaborate’ in various ways and, while focusing on what brain areas engage both, as neuroscientific accounts sometimes do, might not differentiate them enough, it is the contribution each process makes to the other that needs to be recognized. Second, we need to notice that this relationship is premised on the importance of images and imagery (even if not only visual but, nonetheless, sensorial) for both perception and imagination.

The sociocultural approach, as described above, does not reduce imagination to imagery. From a Vygotskian perspective, imagination builds on and produces experience and while this experience does integrate sensorial and perceptual content, it should not be equated with it. For instance, it has been proposed recently, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the imaginary texture of the real, that imagination doesn’t only reveal the perceived world but gives it an affective logic (see Lennon, 2010).
Indeed, experience is infused with emotion just as much (or perhaps more, depending on context), than with pure images and cognitions. Under these circumstances, it is imperative to develop a more nuanced account of the relationship between perception and imagination by placing it within the developmental history of the species and of the person. This is what Pelaprat and Cole (2011) attempted to do by proposing a gap-filling model of imagination. Basing their argument also on perception research (in particular rapid eye movements and fixed image experiments), the two authors assumed that what imagination does is resolve the gaps and contradictions that arise from both biological and cultural-historical constraints, placed on our psychological functioning and, in doing so, it enables a better coordination between thought and action. In their words, “imagination is present in a primitive, yet clear, form even when an object is present to the senses” (p. 339). This is an important conclusion that comes to address one of the biggest divides challenged by sociocultural research: that between what is imagined and what is real (see arguments against their separation in Vygotsky, 2004). However, in building this account, Pelaprat and Cole still conceive of imagination primarily in terms of mental imagery. For them, “human beings are by nature always engaged in a process of image formation, of imagination” (p. 402). While this account does give imagination a key role in the constructing images of objects directly available to our senses, it remains largely silent about subjective experience. The issue of imagination as experience is perhaps best captured by considering phenomenological accounts, a topic briefly reviewed as follows.

b. Phenomenology of art experience

Among other phenomena, sociocultural psychologists have tried to understand the nature of cultural experiences, such as when reading fiction or poetry (Lehmann, Chaudhary, Bastos, & Abbey, 2017; Vygotsky, 1971), watching a movie (Kuhn, 2013b), listening to music (Klempe, 2018), being absorbed by a painting or engulfed in an art installation (Benson, 1993, 2001; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2014), or being member of a theatre audience (Zittoun & Rosenstein, 2018). They also emphasised the transformative effects of these experiences.

A cultural experience can usually be described as an experience of guided imagination thanks to a specific cultural or artistic artefact. Various studies converge in considering that artistic or cultural experience demand a threshold – a ritual, a mise en scène – which signals, for the person, that she will leave the here-and-now world of experience. At theatre or the cinema, these are very clear: one sits in a room with red velvet upholstery, turns off one’s mobile phone, and wait for the lights to change. Entering an art exhibition, one needs to create space in the wide silence to create a specific state of reception. Similarly, specific thresholds mark the end of the experience – lights come back, phone rings, the souvenir shop is near. In between, the actual artist or cultural experience that demands the work of imagination takes place. People indeed have to leave the shores of the known and be taken by the hand, so to speak, in the unknown and strange world offered by the art piece – the liminal experience (Stenner, 2018). All the way along, the person “knows” that this is untrue, yet it is as-if it were (e.g., Hviid & Villadsen, 2018). The person engages actively in imagining: only this imagination is guided, shaped, “scaffolded” by the specificities of the semiotic guidance of the artefact. The art piece is not imposed upon the person; she actually has to draw on her personal experience, biographic trajectories, past knowledge of other cultural experiences, she responds with her embodied reactions – to sounds, space – and her own affects, so as to re-create the proposed piece. Different viewers, with different knowledge of art forms, different life trajectories, and
different general systems of values, will have different imaginary experiences in relation to one and the same art piece.

People also often remember, mention or consider these imaginary guided experiences as important, and these can later be used as symbolic resources (Zittoun, 2006). Hence, a person may feel happy and suddenly a song long forgotten comes to her mind, or, more deliberately, upon migrating to a new country, may use a song to imagine life in the homeland (Kadianaki, 2010); in such cases, people draw on the memory of the imaginary sphere of experience made possible once by the artefact. In turn, these symbolic resources now become further material for imagining and creating, as we will see.

c. Intentionality and imagination

Each of the operations of imagination categorised as intentionality-based – mental state reasoning, moral decision making, mental time travel and autobiographical memory – are commonly hailed as landmarks of *sui generis* human cognition that qualitatively differentiate our engagement with the world from that of non-human animals. Intentionality represents the connecting feature of these operations because they can be exercised intentionally, in specific situations and for diverse purposes. They also enable complex forms of intentionality such as shared intentionality and collaboration, planning an action on the basis of past experience and with regard to its potential future outcomes, and considering how those actions could affect others.

The significant contribution of imagination to social understanding is implicitly acknowledged throughout Theory of Mind literature, however imagination is only recently becoming the direct object of study (Trevarthen & Delafield-Butt, 2017). Glăveanu and colleagues (2017) have proposed a perspectival model of imagination that positions perspective taking as the fundamental process of the operation of imagination. They investigated how people create perspectives of refugees – distant others that they have never personally met (Glăveanu & de Saint Laurent, 2015; Glăveanu, de Saint-Laurent, & Literat, 2018). They showed how imagination is used to make sense of the other and how diverse sources of information are used as resources for constructing both positive and negative imaginings.

Imagination is not only used to understand absent others, but also facilitates collaboration and sharing unfamiliar ideas. A growing number of studies examine the role of imagination in task-solving, in quasi-experimental situations (Pelaprat & Cole, 2011; Zittoun & Cerchia, 2013), in classroom discussions or generally in learning (Akkerman, 2018). Hawlina et al. (2017) studied the processes of perspective taking in dyads who were asked to imagine an improbable scenario. They found that dyads that were more adept at perspective taking produced twice as many ideas. Hilppö et al. (2016) analysed the discussion between children in a science class after one of them asked where stones came from. To answer that question, drawing on stories they heard or images they had seen, they imagined fireballs falling from the sky or sand being glued, before refuting these propositions and finding a more plausible explanation.

The processing of intentionality-based operations of imagination is seen as primarily recollective because they all draw on a lifetime of experience and are thus at no point achieved or complete, but flexibly developing and transforming throughout life. The most obviously recollective is the process of mental time travel, in which imagination has been shown to be closely tied to memory operations.
(Schacter & Addis, 2007; Tulving & Kim, 2007) which allow us to travel into the personal or collective past (autobiographical, episodic and collective memory) as well as into personal and collective futures (de Saint-Laurent, 2018; Jovchelovitch & Hawlina, 2018). In development throughout the life-course, imagination plays an important role in dealing with ruptures, life-bifurcations and transitions (Zittoun & Valsiner, 2016), in reflecting on one’s biographical past or collective past (de Saint-Laurent & Zittoun, 2017), maintaining the continuity in the representation of self across time and contexts (Gillespie, Corti, & Heasman, 2018) and, importantly, in exploring one’s alternatives and possible futures (Zittoun & de Saint-Laurent, 2015; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015). Zittoun and Sato (2018) studied a case of an older woman’s (Ms. S) development after the Fukushima disaster that showed how trauma can constrain imagination and trap people in a foreclosed past, without connection to the present and the future. The restoration of the village graveyard made it possible for Ms. S to acknowledge the reality of the tsunami, connect to the personal and collective past, and start imagining new possibilities for the future. Here we see imagination is crucial for development of people and communities, and how it is facilitated by social recognition and material resources that have cultural meaning. This section has showed that even though recollection provides material for imagining, these processes are not merely reproductive but creative in their own right and it is not certain that a specific situation will produce a single most plausible imagining, but can produce many diverse reimaginings that help us find new ways forward.

d. Imagination as generative

Last but not least, imagination is recognized by sociocultural accounts as generative. Since Kant’s famous distinction between productive and reproductive imagination, the productive or creative dimension of imagination has received considerable attention, to the point of recognizing the generative nature of what was previously considered reproductive imagination (Glăveanu, Karwowski, Jankowska & de Saint-Laurent, 2017). It is most commonly assumed that imagination is creative because its dynamic is fundamentally associative or combinatorial. This point has been clearly made by Vygotsky himself, building on previous work by Ribot (1900/2007).

For Vygotsky (2004), all human activity that “results not in the reproduction of previously experienced impressions or actions but in the creation of new images or actions is an example of this (…) combinatorial behavior” and “this creative activity, based on the ability of our brain to combine elements, is called imagination or fantasy in psychology” (p. 9). This strong connection is made, in part, in order to support the broader argument that imagination is deeply connected with reality. Indeed, it uses components of what is real to generate more or less unusual combinations that, when externalized, constituted the basis of creative action (see Gläveanu, 2014). As we have seen above, Vygotsky considers that the richer human experience is, the richer is the material for imagining. It is undeniable that both creativity and imagination proceed by transforming existing content acquired through perception, stored in memory, and infused by both cognition and affect. What imagination does is open this experience to the future and to the possible by combining it in ways the respond to both present and anticipated constraints. However, the processes of imagination cannot be reduced to simple dissociations and associations between existing elements in one’s mind. Freud added interesting dimensions to this discussion by focusing on the role played by displacement and condensation in the way dreams operate (see Pile, 2000). The elements of experience can also be augmented or simplified, broken into smaller parts and reassembled in a new manner. Reorganizing experience and trying to approximate the lived experience of others (for instance through
perspective taking, Gillespie & Martin, 2014; Glăveanu, Karwowski, Jankowska, & de Saint Laurent, 2017), formulating hypotheses (Harris, 2000) and engaging in ‘as if’ and ‘what if’ explorations (Hviid & Villadsen, 2018) are also key imaginative processes.

In summary, combinations are one of the most basic and most widespread ways in which imagination operates, including in the sociocultural tradition, but this should not exclude other processes (e.g., perspective-taking, divergent ideation) that build on, contribute to or at times even come to replace combinatorial work.

5. An integrative model: The imagination loop

In our brief overview of the diverse operations of the imagination, it becomes clear that there they are not functionally independent, but in fact highly interrelated and co-constructive. For example, in appreciating a conceptual artwork, mental imagery fills in the perceptual gaps and plays with ambiguities. We also experience aesthetic engagement, make inferences about the author’s intent, and creatively construct our own interpretation and personal meaning of the work. Central operational features of the imagination can thus be seen as different aspects of one overarching process of imagining that is simultaneously perceptual, emotional, recollective and generative. Furthermore, we can observe great similarity in the operation of imagination belonging to different categories; all of them begin with the perceptual engagement with the world, from where the movement of thought proceeds through internal landscapes using past experience and semiotic resources to construct a new perspective and transform ongoing activity. Imagination can thus be seen as a highly flexible general process that develops throughout the lifespan and can be employed in different contexts and for different aims. We recently proposed a synthetic model – the imagination loop, “mid-range” between concrete cases and abstract theorization, enabling to see these various occurrences as variations of the same phenomena (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016).

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Figure 1 imagination loop, after Zittoun & Gillespie (2016)

The basic idea, as formulated in Vygotsky, is that imagination is a temporary decoupling from the here-and-now of socially shared experience. Imagination is usually triggered by an event – thresholds as in the case of art experience, boredom, as when students ‘escape’ from a long math class by daydreaming, or when we face an obstacle in the course of action. From this trigger, imagination can be represented as a loop, or rather, imagining deploys as a looping experience – an as-if experience, in which time can be undone, and the usual physical and logical rules do not have to be respected. Last but not least, imagination is nourished by various resources on which the person draws – personal experience, symbolic resources, social representations and discourses, discussions with others, etc.

To account for the diversity of imagination, this loop can be described as varying along three dimensions. The first one is temporal: the loop can be oriented towards the past – in the sense that
remembering is imagining about the past – the future, or alternative presents. The second dimension concerns the distance from material or embodied experience vs. the more abstract or general nature of the imagination. Hence, one can imagine the concrete taste of strawberry, or imagine world peace, a very abstract value. The third dimension represents the degree to which the actual content or outcome of imagination is socially validated in a given sociocultural context and time: imagining that the earth was round was not socially validated a Galileo’s time, it is now.

Eventually, the person’s loop closes and the flow of consciousness is re-coupled to the here and now flow of experience. This looping however has always some outcomes: the slight relief of having let one’s mind wander in a pleasant daydream, a new understanding of one’s past, or the actual solution for a building problem. We believe that, with the help of this basic model, we can account for most individual and also collective forms of imagination (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2018; Zittoun & Glăveanu, 2018). We turn our attention to the latter in the final section.

6. New directions: imagination and cultural change

As proposed so far, sociocultural psychology invites us to conceive imagination as a social and cultural activity. This also means that the process of imagining can be done collectively, and that the outcomes of imagination can affect the social world. A paradigmatic example in the development of such ability of social imagining is pretend play, in which children collectively share their imaginings to construct elaborate scenarios, distribute roles, negotiate the parameters of invented reality, and give new meanings to material artefacts that they use in play (Harris, 2000). Through pretend play, children engage in embodied exploration of how the society functions, practice social roles and hierarchies, set their own laws, act out the operation of institutions such as a hospital or a prison, and rehearse economic participation (e.g., by using marbles as money) (Gillespie & Martin, 2014). As we grow up, we often forget or fail to notice that societies themselves are a sophisticated form of pretend play; they are an intricate, ever-evolving configuration of collective imagination that is intersubjectively shared and materialised in institutions and cultural artefacts such as constitutions, flags, history books, newspapers, monuments, national anthems, and so on. Maurice Bloch (2008) called this form of human social organising “the transcendental social” because through imagination, essentialised roles, hierarchies, prescribed behavioural patterns, abstract rules, and institutional procedures persist in time and transcend moment-to-moment interactions. Cultural and semiotic artefacts are pivotal, themselves a product of imagination that anchors subsequent imaginings in material reality and provides common referents that enable disseminating relatively uniform and coherent images in the minds of millions (Anderson, 1991; Jovchelovitch, 2014; McBride, 2005). And each of these minds sustains an image of millions of others and the collective they form, be it a local community, nation, racial group or the entire human population. Based on such symbolic experience of the collective life and corresponding representations of the other and otherness, people make political decisions such as how to treat refugees (Glăveanu et al., 2018) or how deserving are welfare recipients (Petersen & Aarøe, 2013). Glăveanu and de Saint Laurent (2015) termed the process of intentionally seeking to construct a certain imagining of the society as “political imagination.”

Their imagined construction can make societies and cultures seem fragile, insubstantial and impermanent, and, in times of political crises, financial breakdowns, social unrest or revolutions, they
indeed prove to be less stable and enduring than we would perhaps like them to be. However, it is precisely their imagined nature (Castoriadis, 1997) that allows societies to innovate themselves and gives cultures a forward oriented function. Appadurai (2013) recognises the future as a cultural fact and emphasises that while cultures are commonly defined by looking backwards (at artefacts, traditions, historical narratives), it is the cultural capacity to aspire that enables, nurtures and provides resources for visions of the future. Within sociocultural psychology, researchers have explored how the future is imagined collectively and how imaginings of the collective future are mobilised in the present to steer sociogenesis (see de Saint-Laurent, Obradović, & Carriere, 2018; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). In contrast, when communities lack the cultural capacity to aspire and create positive narratives for the future they can experience deprivation (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernández, 2013), or a collective rupture such as a financial crisis (Triliva, Varvantakis, & Dafermos, 2015). In such pessimistic conditions of being stuck in a miserable present, it is crucial to nourish imagination with the aid of meaningful cultural artefacts so that communities are able to construct new imaginings, rephrase the narratives of despair into ones of hope, to make new meanings and build a positive identity, because through symbolic transformation of how community is imagined, people have the vision and the courage to instantiate real social change (Bloch, 1995; Daiute, 2017).

This brings us back to the epigraph by Vygotsky and perhaps the most pervasive division in the conceptualisation of imagination – the false separation between the real and the imagined, when in fact “the entire world of human culture [...] is the product of human imagination” (Vygotsky, 1930/2004, pp. 9–10), without this making it less real – quite the contrary: since imagination is afforded by and develops through our cultural experience and engagement with cultural artefacts, it is necessarily cultural. And, in turn, the whole of our sociocultural reality is at least partially imagined. It is thus imperative to study imagination and culture not as independent factors that may influence one another, but as completely intermeshed and recursively co-constructive facets of human experience.

7. Conclusion

In sociocultural psychology, imagination is not only an individual process. Even when daydreaming in solitude, one draws on culturally available resources as material for imagining, as well as memories of past social interactions and ideas voiced by others. Many times, the person is even ‘accompanied’ in the daydream by imagined others. Furthermore, the operation of imagining itself has much in common with social processes such as perspective taking or movements between internalised positions and the dialogic interactions between them (Bakhtin, 1981; Glăveanu et al., 2017; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). Finally, the unfolding of the daydream often follows culturally transmitted narrative templates. Imagination is thus always both social and cultural, yet the complex human sociality and culture are also, in turn, enabled by imagination. Imagination is not always a solitary activity – people have the ability to create intersubjective worlds of imagination, to build them collaboratively in interaction with others, and to collectively participate in imagined scenarios. Moreover, individual and collective acts of imagination build new personal and societal resources for imagining and can, through social action, shape the society and culture they draw from.

Hence, sociocultural psychology proposes to reconceptualise imagination as process of temporary disengaging from the socially shared reality of the present. It also proposes to integrate various streams of research into imagination, and thus, to come back to the five streams identified in
Abraham (this volume), it considers imagination as including mental imagery, but also other modes of experiencing; it takes into account the phenomenological experience of engaging with art, but also considers it as socially guided; it admits that it is partly intentional, and can take shape specific interactions as well as the course of a life; and it is highly generative, not only for the person, but also for society. As a whole, sociocultural psychology considers imagination as much more than a fancy or a flight out of the real: on the contrary, as it demands that a person or a group of persons draw on available knowledge, experience, cultural artefacts, and complex skills, it is the fundamental process by which we can explore and share our past – individual and collective, define and visit alternative and possible worlds, and imagine the future – our own, and that of the world – and perhaps, set us in motion toward it.

References


https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0007
For: Anna Abraham (Ed.), *Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination*


For: Anna Abraham (Ed.), *Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination*


For: Anna Abraham (Ed.), *Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination*


For: Anna Abraham (Ed.), *Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination*

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-2275-3_2

https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2014.953564


For: Anna Abraham (Ed.), *Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination*  


